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A Helpful and Efficient IRS:
Some Simple and Powerful Suggestions
BY JOSHUA D. ROSENBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
n a display of almost unimagmable political, practical, and
academic unity,' almost every citizen of this country (including
Professor of Law, Umversity of San Francisco. B.A. 1971, Case Western
Reserve University; J.D. 1974, LL.M. 1981, New YorkUniversity. I would like to
thank Susan Freiwald for her helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft
of tlus Article. I also wish to thank Kathryn Bella, M.D., Joelle Mane, M.D., and
Julie Christine, M.S.W This would not have been written without essential input
from John Adler, who, always self-deprecating, refused my request to allow me to
put his name down as co-author.
' Having been a law professor for 19 years, I have read and contributed my
share of legal scholarship. I have been teaching and writing about tax courses m
law school for 19 years (see, e.g., Joshua D. Rosenberg, Better to Burn Out Than
to Fade Away? Tax Consequences on the Disposition of a Tax Shelter, 71 CAL. L.
REV 87 (1983); Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive
Us Crazy and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV 155 (1996)
[hereinafter Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes]; Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax
Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV 365 (1988) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance]). I have been teaching and writing about Negotiation
and Alternative Dispute Resolution courses for about ten years (see, e.g., Joshua
D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical
Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV 1487 (1994); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of
Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L. REV 467 (1991); JoshuaD. Rosenberg, The Psychology of
Mediation, RECORDE-ADR Supp., Spring 1994, at 9 [hereinafter Rosenberg,
Psychology of Mediation]). Four years ago I began teaching Constitutional Law
(the mastenng of which has done more than anything else to reinvigorate my
interest in taxation for no other reason than the fact that in tax, every once m a
while a question has a determinable answer). In all of these areas, I never cease to
be amazed at how so many smart people can disagree so cleverly and vehemently
about so much. Often a single sentence in an opinion or a statute can generate
volumes of apoplectic agony from all sides. It is against this background that I vew
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Congresspersons, the President, and the Treasury Department itself) seems
recently to have agreed that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") should
become more "customer-friendly "After initially rejecting the very idea of
any "customer-friendly" law enforcement agency, I have now come full
circle to embrace the notion that the new, friendly IRS can not only result
m more efficient tax collection, but also can provide an outstanding model
for every other law enforcement agency serious about its role. In this essay,
I suggest several major steps the IRS can take towards fully achieving its
objectives of better service to taxpayers and concurrent improvement in tax
compliance.
Mymitial rejection of the notion ofa customer-fnendly IRS was driven
by the belief that most people avoid paying taxes whenever they can.2
According to recent estimates, the taxpayers of this country cheat the
federal government out of approximately $195,000,000,000 annually, or
about $1600 per taxpayer per year.3 As a taxpayerwho will ultimately bear
the cost of others' noncompliance, I have no desire to see the government
do anything to make it even easier for people to cheat. To me, the idea of
a "customer-friendly" IRS seemed no more sensible than the idea of an
"enemy-friendly army," or a "cnmmal-fnendly police force."
My worst fears about the "friendly" IRS seemed confirmed by top IRS
officials making public statements such as "tax officials recognize
that the vast majority of people [in this country] want to pay the taxes
that they owe. In fact, most of them are like my father who, if there was
even a doubt, he paid more."4 While I greatly appreciated sentiments such
as these, and had great respect for the official's father, I was scared by the
extent to which the expressed factual assumptions about the rest of
America's taxpayers were just plain wrong.
Before immersing myself in fears of utter disaster that would be
occasioned by the almost complete taxpayer noncompliance I was
envisioning, I decided to find out more clearly what the IRS meant by
"friendly" service to its taxpayers. I was moderately relieved to see IRS
Commissioner Charles Rossotti take pains to point out the inportance of
preventing noncompliance so that "taxpayers who do not comply are not
allowed to place a burden on those who do comply " Nonetheless, I had
with shock and suspicion anything approaching consensus.
2 See Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes, supra note 1, at 157
3See Charles 0. Rossotti, ModernizingAmerica's TaxAgency, 83 TAX NOTES
1191, 1195 (May 24, 1999).
4 John D. LaFaver, IRS Deputy Commissioner for Modernization, quoted in
Bryan E. Gates, At the BackEnd ofthe Parade, TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 3, 1999.
' Rossotti, supra note 3, at 1195.
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some trouble at first understanding how a more friendly IRS could do
anything either to change the current popular conception that others are
often not complying with the law, or to make that conception less accurate
than it is today
In the off-chance that maybe customer-friendly service could somehow
be compatible with increased taxpayer compliance, I began to consider
what the IRS might learn from other customer-friendly and successful
enterprises. I noted that when I go to Nordstrom's Department stores, an
enterprise nationally known for being customer-friendly, an associate is
always available and attentive, guiding me, helping me figure out what to
select, and ringing up the sale. The customer is encouraged, m a very
helpful and friendly way, to buy what the store has to sell, and, often
without knowing it, is subjected to numerous subtle encouragements and
enticements to buy the items on which the store makes a significant profit.
Essentially, successful retailers shepherd the potential customer to the
places they want her to go, ensure that she see and take note of the things
they want her to see, and encourage her to engage in the behaviors they
want. Rather than simply standby andwait for potential customers to make
choices, successful retailers create an environment that affirmatively
encourages some choices (i.e., the choices that are most profitable for the
store) and discourages others.
On the other hand, at some less well-run stores, the customer may be
left alone to wait endlessly for assistance. This very lack of guidance and
oversight that leaves the customer confused and dissatisfiednot only makes
it harder to purchase (because she may have trouble locating the items she
wants and selecting the specific brands that suit her best), but also both
makes it easier to steal (because no one is watching) and engenders a
frustration and hostility that may well encourage theft not only as "self-
help," but also as retribution.6 Conversely, at the well run store, the same
6For example, whenever I shop at Department Store"X" (the editors of the law
review asked me not to use the store's real name, but if you live near one (and
they're all over) you know the store I mean), I stand around for a few minutes
waiting for a salesperson before I eventually break down and call out for help. I
become frustrated and begin to fume as a salesperson comes by only to tell me to
please be quiet and wait because she is busy with someone else (although I can
never figure out who she is helping, because when I look around I notice that all
the other customers I can see seem, like me, to be futilely searching for assistance).
I finally decide to take care of things on my own. Very quickly I become frustrated
because I cannot begin to figure out how to find what I need. It is never long before
I develop an urge to cause damage to the store, but I always manage to leave before
I actually act on that urge.
1999-2000]
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service and environment that make it easy and pleasant for customers to
engage m the behaviors that the company seeks to encourage (purchasing)
simultaneously make it extremely difficult for would-be cheaters to engage
m any undeszredbehaviors (such as vandalism or stealing), if for no reason
other than that sales assistants are always nearby watching (helpfully, of
course).
In many ways, our tax collection system has resembled a poorly run
retail operation: "customers" typically feel like they have been left on their
own to ferret out where to go and what to do. Their available choices often
appear unclear and confusing; while attempting to figure out how to do the
"right" thing (pay what they owe), they are met with numerous temptations
to do wrong (cheat or exaggerate, at least a little). They end up frustrated,
and often engage m behaviors that are frustrating to the IRS, if not
downright illegal. In the end, both sides have suffered, and both sides feel
that they have been wronged.7 "Sales" (tax revenues, to be exact) are way
7While not exactly comparing the IRS to a retail store, tax policy analysts have
noted a likely relationship between inadequate guidance by the IRS and
noncompliance with tax laws. Deborah Schenk pointed out that m the absence of
proper guidance, taxpayers:
[D]o a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis and determine it is not worth the
time and money to comply. Playing the audit lottery, they predict that it is
cheaper and more efficient not to comply, on the assumption that they will
not be part of the 1% of taxpayers who are caught
Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV 121, 166 (1989). Worse, what may begin as
noncompliance with complex recordkeepmg requirements, often in turn breeds
noncompliance in other areas. See id.
While the current system functions in a way that delights a few very
clever tax lawyers and, from time to time, some of their clients, it may
actually increase taxpayer hostility towards the [IRS]. Taxpayers spend
significant amounts of money, time and energy worrying about what to do.
Unless they win the audit lottery, they are less satisfied with the ultimate
result than they would otherwise be, at least in part because their hopes for
successful tax avoidance had been mapproprately raised. Inevitably, some
taxpayers who take positions they believe are legally permissible and
economically rational will end up being punished, by way of tax liability
plus possible liability for interest and, occasionally, penalties.
[P]unishing people for engaging in behaviors that are generally rewarding
can result in increased neurotic and hostile behavior[, so that] the current
system of allowing, and financially encouraging, taxpayers to take
questionable positions, and then laterpumshing them for having taken those
positions, can drive people crazy. Equally problematic, the current system
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down, but the customers remain angry at the IRS rather than pleased with
their ability to pay less than they should. To the substantial credit of the
IRS, it neither denies nor attempts to cover-up its past failures. Indeed,
Commissioner Rossotti himself has emphasized the Importance of
changing the IRS's approach in order to further the goals of both increased
"consumer" happiness and increasing overall compliance!
In this Article, I first point out that some of what the IRS has done in
the past, and continues to do today, is to "shepherd" us through the
taxpaying process. I then suggest what it might do in the future to both
enhance its image as helpful and to substantially increase compliance with
the law. My suggestions spring from the very premises upon which the idea
of a customer-friendly IRS is based, but they go well beyond anything
suggested by or for the IRS to date.
II. How THINGS WORK Now
A. The Taxpaying Process
As Professor Graetz has pointed out, filling out a tax return continues
to be the most common form of participation m our governmental process.
More people file tax returns every year than vote in presidential elections.9
Unfortunately, this necessary and common form of citizen participation is
not a simple one.
Compliance with the tax laws requires action long before a taxpayer's
return is due on April 15 of the following year. Taxes for the entire year
must be predicted even before the year begins, so that the taxpayer can
have the proper amount withheld from wages and can, if necessary, file
appropriate quarterly estimated tax returns. Taxes on wages are withheld
from each paycheck, and taxes on nonwage income must be paid
quarterly ' 0
Records must be properly maintained throughout the year to document
income and potentially tax-significant expenses. According to the IRS's
own best estimates, the average filer of a Form 1040 with no other forms
also results in both the loss of substantial amounts of revenue and the
misdirection of taxpayer energy towards confusing, rather than cooperating
with, the government.
Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes, supra note 1, at 196.
' See Rossotti, supra note 3, at 1195.
9 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 23
(1997).
" See I.R.C. § 6654 (1994).
1999-2000]
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or schedules to complete must spend over three hours per year on
recordkeepmg alone. If she plans to take any itemized deductions, her
recordkeepmg time expands to over six hours. If she has income other than
wages (such as interest or dividends), another one-half hour of
recordkeepmg is required. If she is self-employed, she can count on another
six and one-half hours of annual recordkeepmg on top of everythmg else."I
Before even beginning to deal with the actual preparation of a tax return,
taxpayers must find and gather these required mountains of records. The
best estimates of the costs of keeping these records exceed
$100,000,000,000 per year. 12
Formost taxpayers, these advance recordkeepmg requirements, though
burdensome, are far less burdensome than the rest of the tax filing process.
The Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") is complicated. Regulations,
cases, letter rulings, etc., not only fail to significantly clarify and simplify
the Code, but in their attempts to do so add even more material through
whchto sort. Even for uncomplicatedreturns (Form 1040 with no itemized
deductions or nonwage income), the IRS estimates that merely learning
about the relevant law and/or tax forms takes almost three hours.' 4 Not
surprisingly, the time and expense it takes to fill out the tax forms is, for
most taxpayers, significantly greater than the time it takes to either keep
records or simply learn about the law and/or forms.' 5
B. The IRS as Shepherd
While the IRS does provide important assistance to all taxpayers, few
ofus ever notice. The IRS employs thousands of individuals to give advice
and answer form-related questions over the phone, but the benefits of this
service are mixed and the costs are high. Phone lines are busy, people get
frustrated, people complain that they cannot get the advice they need, or
that the advice they get is incorrect, and when they get correct advice they
may misunderstand or misapply what they have been told. Often the IRS's
best efforts are seen as nothing more than added irritation.
Of more significant benefit to all taxpayers than any individual
assistance the IRS makes available is its continuing development and
" SeeROBERTE.HALL&ALViNRABUSHKA, THEFLATTAX 8-9 (2d ed. 1995).
'
2See id. at 8-12. For wage earners, much recordkeeping, form filling and filing,
and taxpaying is done by their employers. The time spent on these pursuits by
employers is not included in the time estimates noted above. See id.
3 See discussion infra Part II.C.
14 See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 11, at 8-12.
15 See id.
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updating of appropriate tax forms. Any doubters might simply imagine
what it would be like to comply with the tax laws in the absence of the
forms, schedules and instructions provided by the IRS. These papers that
we have grown to hate actually represent the IRS's best efforts to turn an
incredibly complex and complicated Code into some manageable form.
Decades ago, these forms, and the schedules and tables that accompa-
red them, made it relatively simple for most people to calculate their own
taxable income and ultimate tax liability Indeed, for years the IRS did a
yeoperson's job of integrating the numerous diverse (and often apparently
conflicting) requirements of the Code into tax forms that could be used by
most, if not all, taxpayers. Almost no individual taxpayer needed to
understand the Code itself, and, more significantly when compared to
today's world, very few individual taxpayers needed any complex
instructions to complete their required forms. For the vast majority of
people, filling out taxes was easy, and it was made so by the IRS.
C. The IRS as Enforcer
Unfortunately, it seems as if the days are gone when the IRS could
make anything about taxpaying easy We now live m a world where the tax
forms are complicated, the schedules that accompany those forms are more
complicated, and the instructions and worksheets that accompany the
schedules that accompany the forms are even more complicated. It is news
to no one that we are past the days when tax forms are easy for the average
person to fill out. Indeed, while it may be a little less obvious, we are also
well past the days when tax forms are easy for the tax expert to fill out. If
my own experience is an indicator, by last year we passed the time when
tax forms were even possible for an expert to fill out. After years of doing
my own taxes by hand on the forms, I finally gave up. 6 As a result of the
increased complexity of the Code and forms, it would be difficult to find
any taxpayer who actually looks at those forms as any type of help or
guidance. Instead, we tend to see the forms as some cruel torture devices
that must have been intended only to prolong and intensify the already
painful experience of paying taxes.
By far, the most frequent interactions between the IRS and taxpayers
occur only after the taxpayers have suffered through "[t]he Kafkaesque
61 do not mean to say that I could not complete any of the forms. In fact, I
could complete almost all of them. It was only the form that dealt with the foreign
tax credit that held me back. Unfortunately, completion of even a vast majority of
the relevant forms would not have been enough to satisfy the IRS.
1999-2000]
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costs of being in a process without knowing how to help oneself" 17 that
occurs on April 15 .18 These post-filing interactions typically take place only
if the IRS has reason to believe that the taxpayer in question has violated
the law These interactions are usually hostile and confrontational, and they
consume over two-thirds of the IRS's total annual budget.' 9 As a result of
actual or feared confrontations with the IRS, people tend to see the IRS as
something very different from an actual provider of any kind of"service"
they would ever want to use.2"
On the whole, the IRS has concentrated extensively on going after the
"bad guys" after they have robbed the store, rather than on shepherding all
7 Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIs. L.
REV 1267, 1311 (quoting GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES
132 (1978)).
" As Commissioner Rossotti pointed out, currently only about eight percent of
the IRS budget goes to any pre-filing activities. The vast majority of the IRS's
budget expenditures and efforts are directed towards audits and enforcement
actions after returns have been filed. See Rossotti, supra note 3, at 1203.
19 See id. at 1202.
2oSee Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes, supra note 1, at 186.
The segregation of a single agency to do nothing but the "dirty work"
of tax enforcement tends both to exaggerate the temporal and physical
discontinuity between taxes and governmental benefits, and to increase
public hostility towards tax and its enforcement. Because most of us share
a dislike for taxes and a desire to avoid them, we are united in our view of
the Internal Revenue Service as our enemy. Indeed, few would dispute the
suggestion that the [IRS] is the single most hated governmental agency. We
dread the possibility of an audit, and many people see the [IRS] as having
no socially redeeming features other than the fact that it may be sufficiently
bureaucratized, disorganized and generally inefficient to overlook our own
individual return errors.
Our view of the [IRS] as the [big], badhearted and insensitive enemy
tends to persist even when it is someone other than ourselves who has fallen
into its clutches, and we tend to see every tax dispute as one that pits some
taxpayer against our common enemy- the big, mean-spirited, good-for-
nothung-[IRS]. Even those who usually side with the poor against the
wealthy often view the upper-middle-mcome and the rich as the oppressed
underdog when they are confronted by the [IRS]. We tend to ignore the fact
that what comes from the wealthy taxpayers inevitably goes to some other,
often less wealthy, individuals. We see only that those who take from the
wealthy are the same ones who are taking from us, and we feel allied
against a mutual foe.
Id. at 186-87
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potential customers through the taxpaying process m away that maximizes
positive interactions and desired behaviors while minimizing opportunity
or incentive to act wrongfully They have basically taken on the role of
"security guard" rather than "salesperson." In turn, we have tended to focus
only on what the IRS can do to us and not what it can dofor us. Taxpayers
view the tax recordkeepmg, preparation, and payment process as one for
which they are individually responsible, and see the IRS as the "enforcer"
ready to come in at the end to make sure that the taxpayers did what they
were supposed to do.
Ill. AN ALTERNATIVE
A. Real Help to Taxpayers
As the laws, records, forms, and schedules have increased m complex-
ity, a continually growing number of taxpayers have turned to paid
recordkeepers and tax preparers.2 Many of those who do not pay others to
do their taxes and keep their records have turned to tax preparation
software. Often, neither the taxpayers themselves nor the paid preparers
actually use the tax forms prepared by the Treasury Department. Whoever
does the taxes may well just answer whatever questions pop-up on a
computer screen, while the software gives a running account of tax liability
and ultimately prints out the information m a format acceptable to the IRS.
For the paid tax preparers who use the tax software on a daily basis, and
even for those who use it only once a year for their own taxes, tax
preparation software is becoming (although it has not yet become) easier
to use than the forms were, even in the days before the forms became the
intricate behemoths that they are today
With the use of good tax preparation software, the complexity of the
Code need no longer equate with a complex tax preparation process. What
the tax forms did for taxpayers three decades ago is what tax preparation
software does today
Just as the IRS didnot leave development of forms to private enterprise
then, it ought not to leave the software development to private enterprise
now Rather than forcing individuals to pay a tax preparer or to purchase
2 See Tom Herman, A Special Summary andForecastofFederalandState Tax
Developments, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1999, at Al. "The IRS says paid preparers
signed 55.5% of all individual income-tax returns received through April [1999]
up from 54% a year earlier." Id.
1999-20001
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privately developed and marketed software m order to determine their tax
liability, the IRS could develop and make freely available its own tax
software. As do the currently popular, privately produced programs, the
programs developed and made available by the IRS would be able to avoid
any requirement that taxpayers either know the underlying tax law or
engage in any complicated calculations or comparisons.
Essentially, the tax benefits or costs of even the most complicated
provisions affecting most individual taxpayers are based on facts that can
be determined relatively easily 22 When the number-crunching based on
these facts is done by a computer, the entire process can become relatively
straightforward. Much of the information could be imported from past
years, so that after their first filing taxpayers would have to do little more
than enter certain changes m status, income, or expenditures from past
years.
The IRS currently both encourages electromc filing and offers to do
some of the number-crunchmg for some filers, but neither of these options
alone, nor both together, are anything like tax preparation software. The
electronic filing now encouraged by the IRS requires the taxpayer to fill out
a return on her own, and merely allows that completed return to be
transferred to the IRS via the Internet. Although the IRS is now willing to
calculate the tax liability for certain taxpayers, that calculation is done only
after the taxpayer sends m her signed return. Most people do not want to
send in a form with those calculations left undone; whether or not they
trust the IRS, people hesitate to commit to an unknown liability Were the
IRS to develop and make available user-friendly tax preparation software
that does not siply promise to calculate tax liability in the future but does
so for the taxpayer at the time that data is entered, "customers" might
actually come to regard the IRS as the agency that helps them do their taxes
rather than the agency that forces them to confront dauntingly complex
instructions and then persecutes them for failing to understand them. The
IRS could reach, in a helpful rather than merely coercive way, all taxpay-
ers. 23
'- But see Schenk, supra note 7, at 129-30.
23 Of course, those who do not trust the IRS (read "everyone except IRS
employees") will likely suggest that software prepared by the IRS is likely to be
slanted towards the IRS's perspective. The answers to this argument are that it is
no more likely to be slanted than are current forms, and in any event, the program
will be freely available to everyone, and, as a result, will be subject to the kind of
scrutiny that will likely produce accuracy.
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B. Real Benefits to the IRS
1. Increased Compliance
a. The Idea
Of course, the goal of any customer-friendly enterprise cannot be
simply to make the customer happy, but it is to make the customer happily
do what the enterprise wants her to do. Just as good sales help makes it
more likely that a customer will buy a product, the development and
widespread distribution of free tax preparation software could make it more
likely that taxpayers will properly compute their tax liability
By developing good tax preparation programs, the IRS could essen-
tially turn the tax preparation process into one in which the taxpayer does
nothing other than respond to the prompts provided by the IRS. As a result,
the IRS would not only be in a position to make the process a simpler one
of responding to fact-based questions, but it could also control the way m
which those questions are asked and the information that is communicated
along with the questions.
The IRS could ensure that taxpayers are prompted to include all items
of income. A friendly pop-up helper could remind taxpayers that certain
items they wanted to deduct are actually not deductible and that others are
deductible only if they can be properly substantiated.24 It could explain the
kinds of substantiation required by law, explain that taking the deductions
without having the required records is fraudulent, and reveal the penalties
for fraud at appropriate times during the process.25 The program could
firmly suggest that certain actions or questions that typically tend to
generate untruthful responses may be watched closely, and it could make
its point most forcefully at times by pointing out some of the more severe
and intimidating penalties for noncompliance.
While gently (but firmly and clearly) pointing out the dangers of
attempting to underpay taxes, the IRS could also work into its program
information and affirmative incentives to enter data correctly Substantial
research suggests that people cheat on taxes in large part because they
believe that others are cheating (so that they will come out a loser if they
do not also cheat).16 Unfortunately, while the general public has remarkably
24 See I.R.C. § 274 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
25 See id. § 6662.
26 See John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers ThinkAbout Their Taxes: Frames and
Values, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAxES 43,47 (University of Mich. ed., 1992) ("One
of the most consistent findings in survey research about taxpayer attitudes and
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
little accurate information about the realities of taxpayer compliance or
noncompliance, much of the "information" it does get is from taxpayers
who are bragging about their own "triumphs" over the IRS.27 This IS
exactly the land of situation that exaggerates taxpayers' sense that they
ought not to comply. A program that simply and clearly highlights any
facts, the knowledge of which tends to nnprove compliance, could have a
substantial positive impact. f f
In addition to setting forth encouragements towards honesty and
disincentives to cheat on taxes, by setting the parameters of the tax filing
process, the IRS could take a more aggressive role in encouraging
taxpayers to take a more positive attitude towards the IRS and towards
taxes in general. Again, this could provide substantial behavioral benefits
in both the short and long term.
28
b. Will It Really Work?
Of course, to some extent, taxpayers may act as they otherwise would,
and may be unaffected by even very specific prompts, suggestions, or
warnings. The economically rational taxpayer can compute her chances of
cheating successfully, compare the penalties for being caught, and make a
cost-benefit analysis of whether or not to respond accurately regardless of
the prompts and cues on a computer screen. Indeed, the vast majority of
people vehemently assert that their decisions about whether or not to
comply with the tax laws are based on ideas, attitudes and beliefs that are
not likely to be changed by prompts on a computer screen.29 An honest
taxpayer will typically explain her behavior by reference to "integrity,"
"honesty," or maybe even "fear of getting caught," and a dishonest
taxpayer will explain her tax cheating by reference to facts such as "others
cheat," or "the system is not fair," etc."O
Significant research suggests that, in this regard, the vast majority of
people incorrectly explain their own reasons for acting as they do. A large
behaviors is that those who report compliance believe that their friends (and
taxpayers m general) comply, whereas those who report cheating believe that
others cheat.").
27See Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes, supra note 1, at 198-99.
8 See Carroll, supra note 26, at 48-50.
29 To date, I have personally asked this question of over 500 law students
(during tax classes), and have uniformly been told that their taxpaying behavior is
determined only by reference to their beliefs about right and wrong, and not by
anything trivial.
o See Carroll, supra note 26, at 48-50.
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part of our behavior is the result of unconscious learned responses to
stimuli of which we are either unaware or only marginally aware at the
time we act.31 The shopper who buys brands she saw advertised by famous
people on television, or the items suggested by the sales assistant (whom
she will never see again, whose taste is a total unknown, and whose
comments are neither written nor subject to enforcement), is simply
reacting to some very obvious prompts. Recovering alcoholics learn that
certain places or situations "trigger" drinking, and they can substantially
reduce the likelihood of relapse simply by avoiding those triggers.
Examples of our responses to more or less overt stimuli abound. Behavior
that people contend is a result of ex ante rational analysis is just as likely
to be the result of unconscious responses to unnoticed (on a conscious
level) stimuli. In addition, the person's expressed reasons for acting arejust
as likely to be a rationalization that comes after the behavior and is
prompted by the behavior as it is to be a motivator that actually prompted
the behavior it "explains." '32
"l See Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes, supra note 1, at 199-200 & n. 111.
37See id. at 161.
For [most] tax-evaders, the notion that they are stealing from the
government basically because they think they can get away with it is
inconsistent with [the sense of self which they have developed as a
basically good, law-abiding citizen]. In order to allow themselves to
maintain that positive sense of self, the "rational" part of their mmds
develops an understanding of what they are doing and why they are doing
it that allows them to perceive their tax evasion as consistent with being a
good, honest citizen. Whether this rationalization takes the form of
"knowing" that the tax system is unfair, or "knowing" that the government
is bad and misguided, is less important than the fact that, regardless of how
individuals explain their tax evasion behavior to themselves and others, that
explanation is likely to be some ex post rationalization rather than some
guiding vision that motivates the behavior of tax evasion. Once this
rationalization takes hold, it then self-perpetuates and excuses tax
evasion-in the individual's mind-for years to come.
Id. at 200-01 (footnotes omitted).
Empirical studies have demonstrated, for example, that for any taxpayer, if
every factor is constant (including attitude, total income and tax liability, and
knowledge of the likely results of noncompliance), that taxpayer is significantly
more likely to cheat in filling out her forms if the tax is due on April 15 than if she
has previously paid the tax and is entitled to a refund on April 15. See Elizabeth F
Loftus, To File, Perchance to Cheat, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1985, at 34.
[l]n one simple experiment that I have conducted in my own classes,
people are divided into two groups; each group is sent to a separate room
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Even now, the IRS has some opportunity to attempt to gain favorable
publicity from time to time, and every once m a while it puts some wealthy
tax-evader m jail, but its ability actually to influence taxpayers' attitudes
or behaviors is at best minimal. The IRS simply has no opportunity to
influence taxpayers, consciously or not, at the moment when any influence
would be most effective-when they are in the process of filling out their
returns. As a result, anything the IRS does to change taxpayer behaviors is
simply too far removed from the behavior it seeks to influence to be
effective.
Most of us are aware that things closer to us seem larger than objects
of equal size that are far away (for example, we pretty much know that in
reality our hand is not bigger than the moon), and that sounds close to us
seem louder than sounds of equal decibel level far away, but we tend not
to realize that distance or proximity (both temporal and geographic) has an
equally significant impact on the psychological effect of events on feelings,
thoughts, attitudes, and behavior.3" Objects and occurrences physically
and asked to pitch pennies against a wall; and the remaining students
"observe" one of the two groups. One group's penny pitching is met with
complete silence by its observers. The other group is constantly praised for
their ability to get pennies close to the wall, for their good form, etc. The
second group invariably continues to pitch pennies long after the first group
stops. When asked why they continue for as long as they did, they
responded with statements such as "it reminds me of when I was a kid, so
it brings back fond memories," or "it was a good challenge." Almost none
responded that they continued because they were getting cheered on by
others. To bring in a more personal note, I was recently in Las Vegas,
putting money into slot machines. I would tell myself statements such as
"this feels like a lucky quarter," or "this machine is due," or (towards the
end) "I only have six more quarters; I might as well use them up." Like
most gamblers, I actually believed [that] these explanations at the time
[were sensible even if somewhat wlumsical,] and if someone had asked me
why I was throwing my money into those damned machines, those are the
reasons I would have given. Upon returning home (with empty pockets), I
did a little research and discovered, to no surprise, that slot machines had
been configured with the assistance of experimental psychologists to
generate a payout schedule that mirrored the type of reinforcement schedule
that maximally sustains learned behavior. In other words, Iwasn't gambling
because the machine was "due," I was throwing my money away because
I was being conditioned to do so.
Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes, supra note 1, at 200 n. 111.
331 have referred to this phenomenon elsewhere as "psychological perspective
distortion." See Rosenberg, Psychology ofMediation, supra note 1.
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closer to us have more emotional impact than similar objects or events at
great distances, 4 and actions and objects closer to us in time take on more
significance than temporally distant events. Yesterday's news recedes from
our memory, tomorrow's plans get put off until that day is upon us, and
today's minor crises get much more of our attention than rationality would
dictate." When we are filling out our taxes, we are quite close to the
frustration caused us by the IRS, but we are far from any prompts, facts, or
evidence that might positively influence our attitudes or behavior towards
taxpaying.
By developing and distributing software that guides taxpayers through
the entire filing process, the IRS could gain significant access to taxpayers'
attention at the time it would do the most good, and the impact on
compliance could be huge. Indeed, the extent of the real impact of properly
timed and placed early intervention is best understood by analogizing the
taxpayer to a traveler. If the traveler begins a 100 mile journey by going in
a direction that is only fifteen degrees off course, she will end up approxi-
mately twenty-five miles away from her intended destination. If she
receives proper guidance only after going 100 miles in the direction she
began, she will have to travel that extra twenty-five miles to get to her
original destination. If, however, she received the same guidance at the
34 See id. at 10.
Most of us have, at some time, seen an animal that seemed hungry for
affection and have either stopped to pet it or at least felt a twinge of
sympathy for it. We all knew, and would have said so if anyone had asked,
that at that exact moment children in other parts of the world were starvmg
to death, yet we felt more concern for the cat that wanted to be petted than
we did for the starving children. This happened not because we are bad or
selfish or unconcerned, but because all people pay attention to things close
to them. Some readers will doubtless think to themselves that the reason
that we might pay more attention to a kitten in front of us than to a starving
child halfway around the world is that it is easier to do something about the
kitten than it is to help the child. While this may be true, it does not account
for the human behavioral differences. Experiments have been done inwhich
subjects were assured that they could impact equally on different people,
only one of whom was in front of the subject. Almost uniformly, the person
who was present received more favorable treatment than the absent person.
Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes, supra note 1, at 180 n.58.
" In The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People, Stephen Covey stated that
those who can overcome flus tendency to focus on the temporally proximate events
rather than on the events most deserving of attention are significantly more likely
than others to be successful. See STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE SEVEN HABITS OF
HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE (1992).
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beginning of her journey, the extra time, effort, frustration, and conflict
would have been avoided.36 By positioning itself with the taxpayer at the
beginning of her journey through the filing process, and by figuratively
looking over her shoulder as she goes through that process, the IRS could
assure both more compliance and less frustration with the laws.37
With the investment of less time and energy than the IRS currently
spends on taxpayer assistance, it could reach all taxpayers in a way that is
both helpful and self-promoting. The IRS software could be made freely
accessible on the World Wide Web, as are (for a fee, of course) current tax
preparation programs.3" Those without a computer could gain access to
computers at libraries or at IRS offices. Those without computer skills
could be assisted in their tax return preparation. The time saved by the IRS
in transferring data from forms to its own computers would save more than
enough money to sponsor taxpayer assistance programs sufficient to allow
noncomputer-users to file quite easily
36For those who prefer pictures, it looks like this:
} extra effort needed
} extra effort needed
371 In this land of the free, many of our laws tend to give people choices to do
right or wrong, and then to punish them if they do wrong. As gun control advocates
point out, we tell people that it is wrong to shoot others, but we do not make it
difficult to get and use weapons. We tell people that it is wrong to speed, but we
allow them to purchase cars that go 110 miles per hour. Rather than create a system
that reduces the possibility of crimes and bad acts at the beginning, we tend to
leave in place incentives to do wrong, and then assign responsibility to the
wrongdoer and punish her. I do not suggest that holding people responsible for
their actions is inappropriate; it is essential. On the other hand, assigning blame to
the actor ought not to become an excuse for failure by the rest of us to do what we
can to improve compliance with the laws. Rather than wait to see what people do,
we ought to do all we can as early as possible to encourage them to do the right
thing. While a broader discussion of this notion is beyond the scope of this Article,
it is necessary
38 
"The two major [tax preparation] software companies are Intuit Inc., makers
of Turbo Tax and MacnTax, and a [H&R] Block division that makes Kiplinger
Tax Cut." Herman, supra note 21.
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2. Other Benefits
a. A Fairer Tax?
As others have pointed out, tax laws have become more and more
complicated every year for decades.39 Inthe early 1980s, Congress labeled
its tax acts as "simplification" (even though every act so labeled or referred
to actually was more complicated than what it replaced),o but more
recently Congress seems to have at least progressed to the point of ceasing
to pretend that the tax laws are becoming more simple' To be sure, the
unrelenting march towards complexity in the Code is fueled by many and
vaned sources.42 But many ofthe "complicating" changes in recent tax acts
suggest that the trend towards complexity has been fueled in surprisingly
large part by nothing other than a Congressional desire to be "fair."
In the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,1 Congress included several new
deductions, credits, and exclusions designed to help people save, purchase
homes, and pay for schooling. 4 Congress sought to provide this assistance
to the low and middle-mcome taxpayers Congress believed needed it
most.45 Congress realized, however, that whether it providedthis assistance
by way of exclusion, deduction, or credit, those who were most likely to
learn about it, take advantage of it, and save the most from it were the high-
income individuals that Congress had no interest in helping (at least not in
this particular manner') rather than the low and middle-mcome taxpayers
39 See GRAETZ, supra note 9, at 111-22.
4o See id. at 123-24.
" See, e.g., H.R. CONF REP No. 105-2014 (1997) (an 809 page document
describing the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788).42 See discussion infra Part IrI.B.2.c.
43 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
" See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 24, 25A, 220, 221,408, 408A, 530 (1994 & Supp. 1997)
(pertaining to child and educational credits, medical savings accounts, interest on
education loans, regular individual retirement accounts (IRAs), Roth IRAs, and
education IRAs).
45 See H.R. 2014, 105th Cong. (1997).
46 In an effort to keep this particular Article short and focused, I am attempting
to avoid concluding either that legislators really do want to help the poor or really
do not want to help the poor. At this point, for purposes of this Article, I would
only suggest that legislators have many different motives, and that some pieces of
legislation are motivated primarily by attempts to help lower or middle-mcome
taxpayers (read "people who are not major campaign contributors") while other,
sometimes seemingly contradictory and sometimes simultaneous pieces of
legislation, are motivated primarily by other concerns, whether those concerns be
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at whom the bills were aimed. In order to properly target these behavioral
incentives and tax benefits to those in need, without sacrificing significant
revenue to the less needy and more tax-sophisticated high bracket
taxpayers, Congress made use of the land of"phaseouts" that are becoming
more and more common in the Code.47
Basically, phaseouts work by setting an income level at or below which
taxpayers get full enjoyment of the tax'benefit. Taxpayers with incomes
above that level get their benefit reduced proportionately, until incomes
reach the level at which the benefit disappears entirely48 While such
provisions have been around for quite some time, they seem to be gaining
in popularity as Congress attempts to target certain tax benefits more
specifically to low-income individuals.
Phaseouts of tax benefits, including those appearing in the 1997
Taxpayer Relief Act,49 have not always been met with the generous
understanding and appreciation that Congress would like to see, and they
often fail to work as well as expected or hoped. They make the Code
significantly more complicated, lead to the creation of more complicated
instructions, worksheets and forms, and often provide relatively small
benefits in return for the substantial aggravation they create for individual
taxpayers.5 0 Those for whom the tax benefits are intended are the least
likely to employ tax advisors to guide them towards maximizing their
benefits and the least likely to be able to sort through the forms, tables, and
worksheets necessary to claim the benefit. The benefits end up being
substantially less helpful to their intended beneficiaries than Congress
intended.
The development and implementation of user-fniendly tax compliance
software would do much to make phaseouts and similar provisions in the
Code work well. Despite an increasingly complex statute, the software
could make determination of each specific tax benefit quick and easy
People would get the benefit they were entitled to, and they would
economic efficiency, pleasing large donors, or anything else. In other words,
whetherornot one maintains that legislators areprmarily self-serving, mostwould
agree that sometimes they may nonetheless want to do some good things.
47 Phaseouts are "limitations [on tax reliefmechanisms] keyed to the taxpayer's
income level." George B. Kozol, IRA Distributions: Opportunities and Pitfalls,
N.Y ST. B.J., July-Aug. 1998, at 54-55.48 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 67,68, 151 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (covenng limitations on
deductions).
49Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
5oSee Kenneth W Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simpli-
city, Fairness, 81 TAX NOTES 999, 1002-04 (Nov. 23, 1998).
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understand the benefit they were getting (because the program could have
a pop-up helper point out both that they were getting it and why they were
getting it). The tax benefit could reach its intended targets simply and
efficiently
b. A More Efficient System
Like most tax benefits, the education and savings benefits enacted in
1997 were intended not simply to help middle-income taxpayers, but to
encourage them to do certain specific things: to save, to pursue education,
etc.51 If the result of these provisions is simply that taxpayers who engage
m those activities end up with more money, most ofthe provisions' drafters
would see the laws as being less than successful. Instead, success would
require that the provisions act as incentives to their intended beneficiaries
to allocate money in the intended ways; success is measured by the extent
to which the law changes taxpayer behavior as much as (or in many cases,
more than) by the extent of the benefit delivered. Unfortunately, when the
tax laws enacted to provide those incentives are complicated and when the
average taxpayer is told to "speak to your tax advisor" (those with incomes
low enough to entitle them to the tax benefits in the 1997 Taxpayer Relief
Act52 may employ tax "preparers" such as H&R Block, but few, if any of
them actually employ tax "advisors") to determine whether she can take
advantage ofthe new program, the behavioral incentives cannot work well,
because no clear message about the incentive ("do this and you get a good
tax break") ever gets through to those at whom it is aimed.
If the IRS were to create appropriate software, the complexity of the
Code might continue to exist, but for the average taxpayer it would become
irrelevant. What would remain relevant and would properly become the
focus of taxpayer attention would be the end results originally intended to
get their attention rather than the complexity ofwhatever mechanisms were
developed to implement the desired goal. One can now only imagine the
difference between having heard of some vague education tax benefit
program, and having a friendly image and voice pop up on the taxpayer's
computer telling her in a straightforward way that she did or can save
exactly $400 in taxes by simply depositing $1000 in her own savings
account.5
"' See H.R. 2014, 105th Cong. (1997).
52 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
' In order to really enable tax incentive provisions to work well, provisions
giving credits or deductions for certain expenditures or savings ought generally to
be amended so as to allow a taxpayer to take into account for a prior year any such
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c. Complexity and Public Discussion of Taxes and Tax Reform
As noted above, despite loud and repeated cnes for simplification, the
Code becomes more complex each year.' Indeed, we have by now become
so accustomed to the complexity of the tax laws that tax experts are
bemoaning notjust the complexity of the Code itself (which we all take for
granted by now), but the complexity of the discussion of tax complexity'55
payments made on or before the due date for filing a return for that pnor year (that
is, for most taxpayers, April 15 of the succeeding year). If that were to take place,
then the taxpayer who responds to the prompt could immediately benefit by taking
the desired action. The taxpayer who must wait a year to reap a benefit is much less
likely to take the action. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.b.
4 See generally HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 11.
5sDeborah Paul does an impressivejob of laying out some of the discussion in
this area in The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can
Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV 151 (1997). Professor Paul
has compiled a list of articles on the subject:
DAVID F BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 313-15 (1986);
FEDERAL INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION (Charles F Gustafson ed., 1979);
JOHNF WITTE, THEPOLITICSANDDEVELOPMENTOFTHEFEDERALINCOME
TAX 20 (1985); George T. Altman, A Simplification of the Income Tax, 22
TAXES 146 (1944); Walker J. Blum, Simplification of the Federal Income
Tax Law, 10 TAX L. REV 239 (1954); James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity
and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. REV 7 (1989); Louis Kaplow,
Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 4631, 1994); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis
and the Law of Conservation ofAmbiguity: Thoughts on Section 385, 36
TAX LAW. 9 (1982); PaulR. McDaniel, FederalIncome Tax Simplification:
The Political Process, 34 TAX L. REv 27 (1978); Sidney I. Roberts,
Simplification Symposium Overview: The Viewpoint ofthe Tax Lawyer, 34
TAX L. REV 5 (1978); Sidney I. Roberts et al.,A Report on Complexity and
the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV 325 (1972); Adrian J. Sawyer, Why Are
Taxes So Complex, and Who Benefits?, 73 TAX NOTES 1337 (1996);
Michelle J. White, Why Are Taxes So Complex and Who Benefits?, 47 TAX
NOTES 341 (1990); Edward Yono, Federal Income Tax Rulemalang: An
EconomicApproach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV 1 (1982); Edward A. Zelinsky,
AnotherLook at Tax Law Simplicity, 47 TAX NOTES 1225 (1990); see also
Remarks of Hon. Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) of the
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, at the American Bar Association Tax Section's
May Meeting (May 11, 1996), available in 93 TNT 217- 8 (May 16,1996),
LEXIS, FEDTAX Library; Robert B. Eichholz, ShouldtheFederallncome
Tax Be Simplified?, 48 YALE L.J. 1200, 1204 (1939); Louis Kaplow, How
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As discussed below, all of this complexity has numerous causes, is of
several kinds, and has many and disparate effects. Unfortunately, because
the process of recordkeepmg and filling out proper forms and schedules is
now so overwhelmingly complex for most taxpayers, public discussion
tends to lump all of the many aspects of tax complexity into a single image
of thls'overly complex compliance process. If the return preparation
process alone could be simplified, the public discussion of taxation could
be greatly advanced simply because we might be able to evaluate the
different reform proposals on their own merits, rather than simply clinging
to anything that promises to free us from our current struggles with the
forms.
In fact, much of the tax laws' complexity is completely unrelated to the
complexity of tax forms. To begin with, the very concept of "income" is
vague and complex.5 6 Measurng "income" as defined by most economists
would require continuous monitoring of every person in the country,5 7 so
Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the
Income Tax, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 135, 138-39 (1996); John A. Miller,
Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: JustifyingRule Simplification in
the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV 1, 5 (1993); Randolph E. Paul,
Simplification of Federal Tax Laws, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 285, 285 (1944);
Stanley S. Surrey & Gerard M. Brannon, Simplification and Equity as
Goals ofTaxPolicy, 9 WM. &MARY L. REv 915,916(1968); Bons I.
Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV 1, 2
(1974); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax
Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REV 25, 44 (1989); Stanley S.
Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the
Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673,673 (1969);
Michael J. Stepek, Note, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Simplification and
theFuture Viability ofAccrual Taxation, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REV 779,795
(1987); .Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure ofInternational Taxation:
A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV 1301, 1354-55 (1996);
Deborah H. Schenk, SimplificationforIndividual Taxpayers: Problems and
Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV 121, 129-30 (1989); Stephanie J. Willbanks,
Simplifying the Internal Revenue Code Through Reallocation of
Decisionmaking Responsibility, 6 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 257, 315-17 (1987);
Stanley A. Koppelman, At-Risk and Passive Activity Limitations: Can
Complexity Be Reduced?, 45 TAX L. REV 97 (1989).
Id. at 153 n.3.
56 See I.R.C. § 61 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Rosenberg, TaxAvoidance, supra note
1, at 370-75.
"See Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance, supra note 1, at 368.
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we find other substitutes, or proxies, for income. 8 We measure those
proxies only by reference to particular transactions in which people
engage,59 so that from the start we are measuring proxies for income
substitutes. Because those proxies are sometimes maccurate and unfair, we
make exceptions and amendments. 0 As business transactions get more
complex, the Code correspondingly takes on more complexity if for no
other reason than to explain how those new complex transactions are to be
taxed. In addition, taxpayers pay billions of dollars to very smart tax
lawyers to make both new and old transactions look more like transactions
which they are not (but which are not taxed) than like the (taxable)
transactions they are (or at least used to be).6'
Beyond the complexities involved in merely attempting to get a
somewhat accurate approximation of income or its substitutes, the drafters
of tax laws frequently have altogether different objectives in mind:
perceived fairness (which, of course, can vary by 180 degrees, depending
on the philosophical outlook of whoever is doing the perceiving);
minimizmg disturbanceto the economy (efficiency, as perceivedby some);
helping those who need it by decreasing their tax burden; providing
incentives for certain behaviors and investments; providing disincentives
for other expenditures or behaviors; pleasing campaign contributors;
avoiding antagonizing old tax lawyers who know all of the old provisions
and do not want to see them repealed; impressing lawyers with the
technical expertise of the drafters; drafting laws that no one could possibly
understand in order to keep the public from knowing the special individual-
ized benefits certain powerful individuals or corporations are getting;
compromising for the sake of agreement or alliance (logrolling); or making
it more difficult to cheat. These are just a few of these divergent and often
conflicting purposes. Even this list, though infinite in its possibilities, is far
from exhaustive. 2 Numerous provisions of the Code are complex for no
reason other than to make it easier for individuals to do their taxes.63
5" See Paul, supra note 55, at 155 (explaining that "where the law is unclear,
lawmakers respond by producing new authorities that clarify but complicate the
law").
59See id.
6 See id.
61 See Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance, supra note 1, at 378-84.
62 See WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 26;'McCaffery, supra note 17, at
1284-91, Paul, supra note 55.
63 For example, Code sections 62, 63, and 168 (discussing adjusted gross
income, taxable income, and accelerated cost recovery, respectively), would be
difficult for any person to simply read and understand, and would be impossible for
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Along with many different reasons for complexity, there are also many
different kinds of complexity (the number and names of which vary
somewhat from commentator to commentator).' There is technical
complexity (the Code is hard to read and understand), substantive
complexity (even if one can read the words, it is difficult to comprehend
the transactions spelled out), complexity born of indeterminacy or non-
transparency (even if one understands exactly what the Code means, it is
impossible to predict how it might apply to certain transactions not spelled
out in the Code or to variations on other transactions), compliance
complexity (how m the world does one fill out the forms), recordkeeping
complexity, administrative complexity, static complexity, dynamic
complexity, and more.65
Finally, all of this complexity has numerous independent and often
conflicting consequences. For sophisticated taxpayers, the complexity
generates some new opportunities and forecloses some old ones. For tax
lawyers, the complexity of the Code generates lots of billable hours, as well
as lots of hours spent in continuing education and Tax LL.M. programs.
For unsophisticated taxpayers, complexity generates fear, alienation,
suspicion, and, at times, an inability to calculate the proper tax due along
with their returns. Since people tend to distrust what they do not under-
stand, the complexity of tax laws fosters distrust of the government.6
Despite the numerous and often independent reasons for, kinds of, and
impacts of the tax laws' complexity, for most commentators and for the
general public, all this complexity equates directly and forcefully with a
complex compliance process, and vice versa. Many advocates oftax reform
stress "complexity" as the single strongest argument for reform.67 The
clarion cry ofmany has become the notion of a postage-stamp size return.68
Others suggest we just repeal the income tax and substitute an entirely
different tax law in its place because any other law would be less
complex.69
a normal taxpayer to not only understand but also integrate into the determination
of her proper tax liability. These sections are complex to the reader in large part
because they were not really drafted to be read. They were drafted in a way that
would make it possible to develop tax forms that people could fill out.
I See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 17, at 1284-91; Paul, supra note 55.
65See Paul, supra note 55, at 154 & n.4.
See McCaffery, supra note 17, at 1284-91.
67 See, e.g., HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 11, at 1-70; McCaffery, supra note
17, at 1267-69.61 See, e.g., HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 11, at 52-82.
69See, e.g., id. at 1-70.
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While there is nothing inherently wrong with short and simple tax laws,
there is much wrong with focusing on complexity as a single issue with a
single solution. Our response to problems with taxes is too often like my
own response when the tow-track operator I had called asked me to explain
the problem with my unmoving car: "It's the engine," I explained. While
that answer was not (and almost never can be) totally incorrect, neither was
it useful. Indeed, since the problem that necessitated towing (admittedly,
it was a problem with the engine) turned out to be an absence of gas (for
the engine), my diagnosis was worse than sinply useless, because it kept
me from attending to a specific, and easily fixable, problem that could have
saved me substantial towing bills. Similarly, our unified railing against
complexity qua complexity conflates and ignores the numerous separate
and very different causes and effects of complexity, and at the same time
it takes the focus of discussion away from other potential areas of reform,
such as fairness, efficiency, etc. Since the apparent problem is the single
problem of "complexity," the apparent solution to that problem must be
simplification. In fact, it is not true that if we phaseout certain deductions
intended for the poor we must also do away with graduated tax rates or
favorable capital gains rates. Nor is it true that we cannot subject compli-
cated commercial transactions to tax unless we also want to complicate the
taxation of sinple individual transactions.
A very public example of the misdirection that results from a focus on
"complexity" as a single issue is the popularity of a proposed "flat tax."
While many people agree that a flat tax would be good, and many equate
its value with its presumed simplicity, few of those people who support a
"snple, flat tax" agree on what a flat tax is, and much of the confusion
about what a flat tax may be arises from the "complexity problem."'
Many people believe that a flat tax is good because it will result in a
simple and small return. Others believe that a "flat tax" simply means the
same tax rate for everyone, regardless of income, and they like it because
of that feature. Some point to the elimination of all the complexity
generated by a differential rate for "capital gains." Others point instead (or
in addition) to the elimination of certain deductions such as the home
mortgage interest deduction or the deduction for charitable contributions.7
All of these features appear integrally and inevitably related. In fact, they
are not, and they may well have competing or self-canceling results.
10 See GRAETz, supra note 9, at 212-43.
71 See rd.
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If the extreme images of either an incredibly complicated Code or an
incredibly simple postage-stamp-sized return were not presented as
alternatives, we would be left with discussion of two very different and
very important substantive questions raised by the flat tax proposals: (1)
should we have a flat rate or progressive rates?; and (2) since the tax laws
necessarily benefit some and hurt others, and since they necessarily
encourage some activities and discourage others, with what particular
benefits and incentives should we end up? Of course, there are arguments
to be made on either side of each of these issues, and tax scholars,
practitioners, and legislators have made convincing arguments all around.7'
But, surprisingly, these are not typically the issues that dominate discussion
of alternatives like the flat tax, and they are issues that rarely even make it
to the light of public discussion. Instead, public discussion tends to focus
on an issue that need not exist at all for most taxpayers-the complexity of
compliance. 73
An easy-to-use tax compliance program could quickly turn the tax
reform debate towards the important substantive issues. While turning the
debate more towards issues such as efficiency and fairness would not alone
solve those issues, it would do much to make them understandable, and that
alone would greatly enhance public discussion and consideration of the tax
debate.
C. A Cheaper Alternative
The IRS already cooperates with the producers of most tax preparation
software, if only in ways that enable convement electromc filing. Rather
than start from scratch in developing software, the IRS might sinply
expand its cooperation with some of the current private producers of such
software. Programs that properly prompt taxpayers to do the "right thing"
rather than prompt them to look for ways they might escape audit or find
new deductions might be approved for use by the IRS, and with that
approval could go reduced chances of audit, increased financial incentives,
or other ways to encourage their use. The IRS could condition its approval
upon satisfying itself that the program as developed and as used will have
sufficient prompts, encouragements and warnings about complying that it
will be effective to increase honesty among those who use it.
72See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 11.
73See McCaffery, supra note 17, at 1272.
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IV RECORDKEEPING
A. Third-Party Reporting
As noted earlier, it is not just filling out the forms that makes tax
compliance so difficult for the average person.74 Currently, the burden of
recordkeepmg for income other than wages, and for most deductions, falls
entirely on the taxpayer, resulting m substantial work for the scrupulously
honest and substantial temptation for others. If the IRS could relieve
taxpayers of some of this burden, it could save significant time and trouble
all around.
In the past, taxpayers have not only not asked for the IRS's help m this
area, but have struggled hard against legislative or administrative actions
that would have led to a transfer of more of the recordkeepmg burden to the
IRS.75 Indeed, the reasons that taxpayers have chosen to avoid IRS
assistance in recordkeepmg are the very reasons why the IRS itself could
benefit substantially from assisting taxpayers in this endeavor.
Generally, tax compliance is very high only among those who have no
choice but to comply, while cheating is high among those who have the
opportunity to do so.76 Wage earners, who have their income reported by
their employers and have their taxes withheld from paychecks, do not even
try to cheat (at least with respect to that wage mcome).' On the other hand,
when individuals earn money in ways for which the receipt is not reported
by the payer to the IRS, opportunities to underreport that income (or to not
report at all) exist, andwhere such opportunities exist, many taxpayers find
them irresistible. 8
If more sources of income were reported directly to the IRS by payers,
the recipients of income might be relieved of independent recordkeepmg
responsibilities, and at the same time they would be less able to cheat
successfully and less likely to even try to do so. We have made significant
progress in the area of third party reporting in the last years, but there is
more that can be done.79
B. Automatic Taxpayer Reporting
Of course, much of the recordkeepmg burden that falls on taxpayers is
the result of their desire to substantiate deductions, rather than to simply
74See discussion supra Part H.
7sSee GRAETZ, supra note 9, at 93-100.76See Rosenberg, Psychology of Taxes, supra note 1, at 206.
77 See id.78 See id. at 207
79See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 9, at 93-98.
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report income. The amount and detail of records needed has grown
significantly m the last twenty years.8"
Within a very short time, however, the government's ability to
circumvent the need for much ofthe taxpayers' independent recordkeepmg
could grow geometrically Americans use credit cards for much of their
purchasing.8 It would be quite easy for the IRS to work with some of these
credit card issuers to devise a system that would allow records of tax-
significant transactions to be made accessible to the IRS. Transaction
records could be maintained for purchasers and sellers, and data regarding
the time, place and substance of the transaction could be automatically
forwarded to and Ietamed by the IRS. Independent recordkeepmg
requirements for taxpayers could be decreased substantially, and the
accuracy and completeness of the Service's own data could be much
improved.
The recordkeepmg I suggest is already done by banks, brokerages,
service providers, and sellers of goods; the information is often sold (with
the consumers' written consent, but without their actual knowledge because
they usually fail to read the fine print) to other would-be service providers,
sellers or advertisers.8 2 Essentially, I am suggesting only that information
that is already available to private parties for a fee, and that is necessary to
ensure compliance with tax laws, ought not to be restricted in a way that
makes ensuring tax compliance significantly less efficient, more costly,
and, in the end, more burdensome to everyone.
I have little doubt that many would think that the notion of direct IRS
access to the daily transaction histones of taxpayers is, to put it mildly,
awful. Many Americans place a high value on privacy, 3 and many of us
have trouble adjusting to the fact that records about our lives may be
maintained by sellers, purchasers, credit card companies, computer and
software manufacturers, and internet service providers.8 4 People are even
now concerned about annoying sales and solicitation efforts generated by
10 See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 11, at 20-35.
81 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, Thl. 822, at 523 (118th ed. 1998).82 See Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Eco-
nomic Defense ofPrivacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2402-07 (1996).83 See id. at 2381-417
84 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Personal Pnvacy in the ComputerAge: The Chal-
lenge ofa New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REv
1089 (1969); Robert C. Post, The SocialFoundations ofPnvacy, Community and
Selfin the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV 957 (1989); Judith Jarvis Thomson,
The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF 295 (1975).
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the disclosure of their financial transaction records. Surely the last thing
some people might want to do is to provide this kind of information to the
IRS, which might proceed to use it for political or personal blackmail or
vengeance.
If one can struggle past the initial revulsion that my suggestion might
trigger, however, the suggestion, in at least a limited form, may indeed
prove appealing. First of all, transaction histories would need to be
forwarded to the IRS only when individuals are engaging in potentially tax-
significant actions (as determined by the individual herself). Records of any
expenditures that the taxpayer determines to be a personal (for tax
purposes) need not be forwarded to the IRS.
Additionally, the information that would assist in tax-relevant
recordkeepmg 5 is already "out there" and is currently accessible not just
by the IRS, but by private parties. The proper question is not whether the
relevant data should be kept confidential: it already is not confidential. Nor
is the question whether the information can be kept out of the grasp of the
IRS. The IRS already can gain access to it, at least after showing that the
records may tend to substantiate or refute taxpayer claims.86 Although most
taxpayers never actually have to present the data to the IRS (because a very
small percentage of taxpayers are ever audited and asked to actually
substantiate their deductions), the law requires not only that they present
the data when it is requested (for example, on audit), but that they maintain
the data whether or not it is requested by the IRS, and that they keep it
ready for the IRS should it wish to inspect the records. In other words, the
data that might be automatically made available to the IRS would only be
data that was not and could not be kept confidential from the IRS in any
event.
87
If, as might well be likely, privacy concerns would carry enough
weight to prevent even an attempt by the federal government to gather and
maintain all of the necessary (to a proper determination of tax liability)
information in the absence of individual consent, the IRS could present
such access as merely a service offered to taxpayers who desire to take
advantage of it. The government need not require every taxpayer to enable
direct IRS access to accounts, but it could simply offer the possibility to
taxpayers who seek relief from recordkeeping requirements and who want
" This would include the cost, description, date of purchase, and use of items
acquired for use in any business or other income-producing activity, and the
specifics of any charitable, medical, or business-related repair or maintenance
expense, etc.6See GRAETz, supra note 9, at 95.
7 See id.
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to further snplify their own tax compliance process. Those who opt into
the direct access would save time for themselves and for the IRS, and
would be significantly less likely (or able) to cheat. In return, they might
well become less subject to audits in the areas covered by direct access.
Taxpayers who choose to keep their own records m a manner that is
inaccessible to the IRS, absent an audit, might expect to be watched more
closely than those who take advantage of the IRS's offer, but they would
forfeit no rights to privacy from the government that they now enjoy
Were the IRS to offer significant recordkeepmg services to most
taxpayers, the offer itself ought to, and perhaps would, bring about a major
shift m public discussion of tax. While some taxpayers might continue to
complain, those complaints wouldnot be that it is difficult and complicated
to keep the proper records, but only that it is difficult to keep those records
temporarily secret from the IRS. As more and more people are beginning
to realize, the kind of privacy that most people would prefer to maintain
with respect to their expenditures, whether or not those expenditures have
any tax significance, is a kind of privacy that does not exist now and has
not existed for several years. The difference is that the information is now
m the hands of private enterprise, which often acquires it without the
knowledge of the consumer and uses it (or sells it) in order to maximize
profits, rather than m the hands of the IRS, who could acquire the
information directly only after knowing consent of the taxpayer and would
(hopefully) use the information to calculate and collect proper tax
liabilities.
V WHITHER THE TAX LAWYER?
As a tax professor, the last thing I want to do is anything that takes
potential jobs away from my students. Fortunately, the nplementation of
technology to make recordkeepmg and compliance relatively straightfor-
ward need not interfere with the need for lawyers to do effective tax
planning. Indeed, increased access to and use of accurate tax preparation
might well increase the use of tax planners. When it becomes more
difficult to engage in post hoc tax planning (by simply cheating), the need
for prudential foresight may become clear. I have heard several outstanding
tax attorneys say that their job is to help their clients do what Congress
wants them to do, and to help direct transactions so that money goes where
it is supposed to go. Early and accurate assessment of the taxes that result
from those transactions will neither lessen nor interfere with the need for
such activities.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Service has expressed a sincere desire to take
steps that will make filing easier and compliance with the laws more likely
It is in the process of reorgamzing and reprioritizmg. My suggestions
simply usher the IRS down the path it has chosen to follow The same
development and implementation of software that will eliminate the
burdensome complexity of tax recordkeepmg, preparation, and filing will
also enable the IRS to make huge progress towards both eliminating
opportunities for noncompliance and clarifying public discussion of taxes.
